Law Enforcement Responses to Homeland Security Initiatives: The Case of Ohio

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Abstract
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, law enforcement’s roles changed dramatically at the federal, state, and local levels. Although there have been some mandated changes in local policing (i.e., in training and communication), the specific responsibilities of local police remain unclear and undefined. This study looks at the responses that local departments have made in Ohio since 9/11. A survey of all Ohio police chiefs was conducted in the fall of 2007, asking about what they have done to protect their communities from potential terrorist attacks, the grant money they have received, and their responses.

Key Words: homeland security, Ohio, local law enforcement

INTRODUCTION

Homeland security became a prominent national concern after the terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Pelfrey, 2005). Congress reacted to the attacks by passing the U.S.A. Patriot Act that reshaped the federal bureaucracy (Roberts, 2005) and gave new powers to law enforcement that altered the day-to-day operations of policing in almost every agency nation-wide at all levels of government. Those new laws, combined with the continual threat of potentially deadly acts against the U.S., ultimately redefined federal, state, and local policing (Oliver, 2007, p. 98). Many of the traditional policing patterns changed dramatically. Law enforcement personnel are still trying to understand how to use these new powers to fight terrorism in their jurisdictions (Oliver, 2007, p. 98). These changes are of particular concern to state and local law enforcement personnel, who are the first responders to emergency situations.

The goal of this paper is to examine more fully the role of state and local law enforcement in homeland security policy in the post-9/11 period (Reddick & Frank, 2006). It is hoped that
the study will provide better clarity about what state and local governments are doing to protect their citizens in response to the terrorist attacks and the subsequent Patriot Act. This will be done by examining what Ohio’s law enforcement agencies have done to respond to changes in federal funding opportunities, training requirements, and increased communication with other agencies. The results will show if law enforcement departments across Ohio are responding to mandates from the federal and state governments concerning homeland security. This case study will give insight into how local departments are responding to threats posed by terrorism and challenges in protecting the public.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Although many people may consider Homeland Security to be a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, it is not a new policy area for the United States government (Beresford, 2004). Federal involvement in domestic disturbances can be traced back to the early 1800s (Oliver, 2007, p. 61). At that time, it was then related to civil defense (Relyea, 2002). During World War I, more attention was given to protecting the home-front from foreign enemies (Oliver, 2007, p. 62). It was after September 11, 2001, that the concept of homeland security, as we now know it, began to take shape (Relyea, 2002), becoming the “in” policy (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007).

Prior to the 2001 attacks, experts studied the risks of terrorism and repeatedly identified the lack of coordination as the greatest problem between the many agencies related to homeland security. At that time, law enforcement intelligence was highly fragmented and compartmentalized. For instance, the FBI dealt with domestic threats, whereas the CIA dealt with foreign threats. The Defense Department had a separate intelligence operation, with each of the armed forces running their own version. The NSA gathered electronic intelligence from spy satellites and intercepted cell phone calls. The operations between the State Department and Secret Service were related, but mainly to each other (Kettl, 2007). During this time, the U.S. government did not have a framework for bringing resources together to deliver security against terrorism (Carter, 2001: 12).

Inadequate information sharing by these and other federal entities was a primary factor in the terrorist attacks on this country in 2001 (Relyea, 2004, pp. 420, 423; see also Caruson, 2004; Clayton & Haverty, 2005). Once the attacks occurred, it became obvious that our national security efforts on American soil lacked coordination between agencies responsible for disaster management (Caruson & MacManus, 2006). To address this problem, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created (Caruson, 2004; Simpson & Strang, 2004). Officially established in March of 2003, DHS was created to enhance the coordination among state and municipal law enforcement agencies (Relyea, 2003, 2004). DHS concentrated the anti-terrorism mission into a single agency, since none of the existing cabinet departments was a natural lead agency (Carter, 2001, p. 12). The mission of DHS is to protect the American public from future acts of terror and minimize the impact if one does occur (Caruson, 2004). Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, five directorates were established to better coordinate efforts: Border and Transportation Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP & R), Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), Science and Technology (S&T), and the Office of Management.
In addition to creating DHS, the Bush administration also announced two major directives that set forth federal homeland security initiatives. One was the Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 5, Subject: Management of Domestic Incidents. This directive established clear objectives in the effort to prevent terrorist attacks, minimize the damage done, and recover from attacks and other major disasters. This directive enhances the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive management system. The second initiative, HSPD-8, deals with National Preparedness. This directive identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents (Caruson, 2004). Specifically, it describes the way the federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a response plus prevention of terrorist incidents. Together, HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 are central to the training requirements for state and local agencies.

In addition, HSPD-5 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System, or NIMS. NIMS was designed to provide a national approach to incident management and is applied at all jurisdictional levels (Caruson, 2004). In other words, it provides for a consistent approach to attacks and disasters that directs federal, state, and local governments to work together when responding to incidents of all magnitude (Ohio Department of Public Safety, 2007). In the future, NIMS standards are to be included in all hazards plans, policies, procedures, training and exercises. NIMS has two key functions. The first is to be applicable across a full spectrum of potential incidents and hazard scenarios, regardless of size or complexity. The second is to improve coordination and cooperation between public and private entities in a variety of domestic incident management activities (Emergency Management Institute, 2008).

Compliance with NIMS was to take place by fiscal year 2005. Moreover, Federal departments are to make the adoption of NIMS by state and local organizations a condition for federal preparedness assistance (grants, contracts, and other activities). Jurisdictions could also comply in the short term by adopting the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS is a disaster management tool that provides a set of rules to guide organizations when responding to a disaster. It created a division of labor and coordinates them (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006).

Based on HSPD-5, the National Response Plan (NRP) was also created. The NRP has specific standards to enhance the ability of U.S. agencies to respond to domestic incidents. The NRP combines many response plans into one effective structure to reach their goals of a safer nation. Effective in early 2008, the NRP was changed to the National Response Framework. This document sets up goals surrounding training, communication, and grants, each of which are described below.

Training

Training and acquiring skills are important for both trained citizens and first responders (Drabczyk, 2007; Humphress, 2007). The NRP and the Patriot Act set forth specific requirements for training law enforcement officers to better deal with potential terrorist acts. For fiscal year 2007, training courses IS-100 and 200 (related to incident command), and IS-700 and 800 (related to the NRP and NIMS), were considered a “Tier 1” requirement. The expectation was for these courses to be completed by the appropriate personnel and that new or returning personnel would also complete such requirements. IS-700 is an introduction to NIMS. It introduces the key concepts and principles underlying NIMS. IS-800 is an introduction to the
NRP. DHS now mandates use of IS-800b, which reflects the new National Response Framework. Together, these courses specify how the resources of the federal government will work in coordination with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to respond to incidents of national significance. IS-100 is an introduction to ICS—the Incident Command System. This course specifically discusses major ICS function and their primary responsibilities. Other aspects include: ICS organizational units, span of control, major incident facilities and the function of each, what an Incident Action Plan is and how it is used, and the common responsibilities associated with incident assignments from the response perspective. Finally, IS-200 is a complement to IS-100. This is a more detailed take on the ICS features and includes such elements as ICS management functions, organizational flexibility, resource management, and personnel accountability.

Grants

In order to help states fulfill their homeland security needs, DHS distributed grants to local law enforcement agencies. The grants serve to influence the priorities and behavior of state and local governments (Roberts, 2007). These major grants were the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) (Roberts, 2007). The SHSG funds were distributed according to a formula, requiring that 80% of the money had to be passed on to local governments (Caruson, 2004). The counties would get the money and distribute it as they saw fit. At the outset, the funding was based on population so everyone got roughly the same amount of money (Kady, 2004).

Studies show that there has been a reallocation of federal funding to homeland security. Prior to 9/11, the emphasis for federal funds was on crime reduction and quality-of-life issues. Money was put into projects that increased communications between police and citizens. Now, the emphasis is on national security and anti-terrorism issues. Money is focused on programs that are aimed at reducing the threat of terrorism, or the consequences of terrorist acts. Federal grants support equipment and training, security, and communication between police departments and agencies on the federal level (Braunstein, 2007, p. 157-158). However, as noted earlier, in order to get preparedness funding, states were required to adopt and implement NIMS.

DHS has recognized the important role that local police play in homeland security and has increased monetary assistance to them (Friedman & Cannon, 2007). In fact, DHS has spent $11 billion on emergency preparedness response from 2001-2004 (Roberts, 2005). More recent figures show that $400 million has gone directly to support state and local programs (Friedman & Cannon, 2007). In fact, grant funding for state homeland security grants from DHS in 2004 was over 10 times the amount it was in 2001, reaching $1.7 billion (Roberts, 2005, p. 439).

In fiscal year 2006, DHS provided approximately $1.7 billion in funding to states and local government through the HSGP grant program (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). By Fiscal Year 2008, DHS estimated it would award more than $3 billion in grants to states and urban areas, all designed to increase national preparedness and protect critical infrastructure. The bulk of that money would be awarded through HSGP, which would total about $1.7 billion itself. Other money would go toward the Infrastructure Protection Program (IPP) ($852.4 million), Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) ($291.4 million), Operation
Stonegarden grants (OPSG) ($60 million), Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCP) ($60 million), and others (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).

But there have been problems with the grant programs. When compared to other budget areas, homeland security received less than 2% of the overall budget (“Setting Our Priorities,” 2008). Some reports show that small, isolated states receive more money per capita for homeland security than do large, high-risk states (Roberts, 2005). Many departments receive funds for which they have little use, while others do not receive money they need (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007). They are also not giving grant money to the states that face a greater terrorist threat. Like most grants, they follow a formula that provides a minimum amount of money for each state. This means that small, low-risk states receive more money per capita than larger or high-risk states (Roberts, 2005).

Even with federal funding, for many agencies, these initiatives often exhaust a region’s emergency resources (Vedra, 2005). State and local departments often feel the brunt of financial burdens that may result from homeland security initiatives. Some officials feel that homeland security will become an unfunded mandate, where the federal government demands action but the cost of action is borne largely by cities and states (Kady, 2004). Protecting critical infrastructure from terrorists has already been identified by some as a federal mandate which has placed additional obligations on state and local governments. (Swindell, 2004). The first Homeland Security Secretary, Tom Ridge, often said that homeland security is a “national” responsibility, not just a federal one. This means that state, county, and city agencies are partly responsible for costs (Swindell, 2004; Tubbesing, 2007). In FY 2005, Homeland Security activities cost states over 1.145 billion (“States Stuck,” 2004, p. 10). However, the mandate to provide homeland security is not technically unfunded. The federal government recognizes that when state resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, governors may request and receive federal assistance.

Even though DHS has tried to create different methods to provide guidelines to direct states and local agencies (Roberts, 2007), they have had little guidance on how to spend the money, or how to divide it among the potential mix of preparing for terrorism, natural disasters, or even technological disasters. In other words, even though the federal government is providing money, they are not providing guidance on how to spend it (Caruson, 2004; Roberts, 2005).

Communication

DHS has identified the need to improve coordination and communication between all agencies that are responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information as a way to reduce the threat of future terrorist attacks (Caruson, 2004). Extensive communication between local, state and federal governments has become a key characteristic of U.S. homeland security policy (Gerber, Cohen, Cannon, Patterson, & Steward, 2005), and most law enforcement agencies view information sharing as a necessity (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007). Local police departments must communicate with the federal government, and they must also be willing to transmit information to other local governments. The information sharing can also involve joint efforts geared toward identifying and preventing terrorist plots (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007).

Many departments lack the ability to communicate successfully with other departments. Even if they have the incentive to communicate, they can only do so with the proper infrastruc-
ture (Caruson, 2004). Many small, rural communities lack the technology to do that. Many other local agencies are finding it difficult to meet the standards set by state and federal departments because of a lack of money, even with federal assistance (Kettl, 2004, Gerber et al., 2005). Many cities lack appropriate protective gear, communications equipment, and training experience (Hart & Rudman, 2002; Gerber et al., 2005).

**OHIO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY**

The U.S. Constitution establishes a system whereby the primary role of homeland security is given to state and local governments (Oliver, 2007, p. 59). Even though this role has evolved over time, state and local governments today have primary domain over homeland security (Oliver, 2007, p. 61). According to the NRP, incidents should be managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional levels as these personnel are often the first to arrive at an emergency. Even DHS has identified the challenge of achieving preparedness at the state and local level as key to the success of homeland security (Caruson, 2004, p. 3). So it makes sense that the focus of homeland security analysis should be centered on state law enforcement activities.

Ohio’s Governor at the time of the terrorist attacks, Republican Bob Taft, created the State of Ohio Security Task Force to develop a coordinated, integrated, comprehensive state strategy to address security issues by strengthening state preparedness at all levels of government. The Task Force includes four working groups that assist in coordinating Ohio’s efforts in preventing, identifying, and responding to terrorist activities against potential Ohio targets. The working groups include the Ohio Homeland Security Advisory Council, Public Information, Pandemic Preparedness Coordinating Committee, and Ohio Citizen Corps Council. As above, there were three areas of need addressed—communication, training, and funding.

**Communication**

Many law enforcement personnel across Ohio identified the need for increased communication after 9/11, not only within an agency itself, but also between agencies within the state (horizontal communication), and between the federal and state agencies (vertical communication) (Caruson & MacManus, 2007). It was hoped that this would result in increased cooperation between agencies on not only anti-terrorism, but other issues as well (Braunstein, 2007, pp. 159-160). In their Homeland Security Strategic Plan, one of Ohio’s goals was to facilitate increased sharing of timely, reliable, and pertinent homeland security intelligence and information across many jurisdictions and disciplines. Law enforcement officers must be able to electronically share data and records in order to prevent a future terrorist attack or to ensure the ability to communicate during a crisis. The Ohio Local Law Enforcement Information Sharing Network (OLLEISN) was designed to meet these goals.

OLLEISN is a secure, Internet-based system designed to enable Ohio local law enforcement agencies to share various types of information with each other. This is very much dependent upon the kind of information collected by a local agency. However, OLLEISN is able to retrieve and share multi-jurisdictional information about persons, locations, and property related to warrants, incident data, and alerts. Other types of information available include: field interview notes; suspect, witness, and victim information; property types; search warrants; traffic citations; pawn transactions; service calls; registered offenders; concealed carry permits.
and firearm registrations; evidence; biometrics (i.e., mug shots, finger prints, signatures); and
text searches (Ohio Local Law Enforcement Information Sharing Network, 2008). Overall, the
purpose of OLLEISN is to improve officer safety, provide information on persons of interest
and any record of contacts they have had with the law enforcement agencies in Ohio, provide
information to confirm or disprove an officer’s hunches, and provide statewide information to
supplement other investigatory tools. Currently, there are 753 law enforcement agencies con-
tributing information to OLLEISSN, with and additional 60 agencies interested in participating
(Ohio Local Law Enforcement Information Sharing Network, 2008).

**Training**

Ohio officials created a strategy to accomplish full implementation of NIMS throughout
the state in a multi-phase operation. Their Homeland Security Strategic Plan, created in 2004
by the Ohio NIMS Implementation Senior Advisory Committee, identifies 36 strategic goals
and 205 objectives that are designed to protect the state from terrorism. Law enforcement agen-
cies in the state were required to meet specific standards by the end of FY 2007, as outlined in
the Strategic Plan.

**Grants**

Changes in federal funding priorities have led to changes in the organization of agencies at
the state and local level (Roberts, 2005). Much of the federal money for homeland security is
given to the state, which is then responsible for disbursing it to local agencies. Table 1 [bottom]
has the grant totals received by Ohio from the Department of Homeland Security. When that
money is distributed to states, it is often earmarked for specific purposes. For example, in July
2007 it was announced that the state was to receive over $75.6 million in federal Homeland
Security grant funding for the purpose of assisting with communications and other homeland
security initiatives. That money consisted of:

- $15,480,000 in Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) funding
- $16,830,000 in State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) funding
- $12,020,000 in Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) funding
- $1,548,971 in Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) funding
- $441,938 for the Citizen Corps Program (CCP) funding
- $29,337,337 in Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant funds (“Ohio
to Receive”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$28.95 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$117.9 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$121.55 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$101.37 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$41.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$75.6 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Obviously, funding is central to Ohio’s law enforcement responses to homeland security initiatives. Unfortunately, there have been some problems with such funding. The money provided to fulfill domestic security goals has often been inequitable, and there have been issues with the allocation, management, and shortages of funds. Many departments have received funds they have little use for, while others have waited for needed federal dollars (O’Hanlon, 2006).

CURRENT STUDY

Through the Patriot Act and the NRP, the federal government has established standards and guidelines for all law enforcement agencies to prepare for, and respond to, potential terrorist action. Some police agencies are facing new challenges in responding to these mandates as the roles played by different law enforcement agencies are still being clearly defined. Law enforcement agencies on the state and local levels are complying with the federal standards to different degrees (Roberts, 2005). Specifically, what is the role of state and local government in a post-9/11 environment? (Bodrero, qtd., in Oliver, 2005).

It is important to study states not only because they are the first responders to emergencies (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007), but because their commitment to homeland security is an essential component of effective counterterrorism across the country. Local governments have the best knowledge of their individual needs (Reddick & Frank, 2006; Wise & Nader, 2002), and most homeland security policy contends that information should be gathered on the local level and then shared with state and federal governments, and that infrastructure protection and response is at the local level (Friedman & Cannon, 2007). Because there has been so much federal emphasis on enhancing local government counterterrorism preparedness, it is important to examine local policy responses in the area of homeland security (Gerber et al., 2005). The current research will show us how or if shifts in federal funding have influenced local communities in different ways.

Past research has indicated that it is important to understand if a community has improved its overall capacity to respond (Simpson & Strang, 2004). The current study will show if the changes departments make, if any, are dependent factors such as the size of the department, resources available (both financial and personnel), federal funding, and the location of the department (city versus rural). Since there is still much confusion as to agency roles and funding, the question remains, “where does that leave state and local police and their role in homeland security?” (Oliver, 2007, p. 98).

METHODS

To get a better understanding of how local law enforcement agencies have responded to the strategic goals and directives defined by the federal government, a survey of all Ohio’s law enforcement chiefs was administered in the fall of 2007/spring 2008 time period. The purpose of the survey was to determine if state and local police agencies in Ohio are addressing the required changes and, if so, to what extent. It was also a way to know why they are making changes, or conversely, why not? Since little is currently known about local police departments’ responses to homeland security issues, this study was a way to fill the gap that now exists about the overall trends or patterns concerning law enforcement’s responses to terrorism, the Patriot Act, or mandates set forth by either the state or federal government.
In total, there were 466 surveys mailed to all police chiefs in Ohio, from major cities to rural agencies in a two-wave process. The survey was intentionally kept short, for a minimum time commitment on the part of the respondents (Drabczyk, 2007). The chiefs were assured confidentiality of their responses, and thus no identifying marks were placed anywhere on the survey (Reddick & Frank, 2006). In the end, 260 responses were returned, for a response rate of 56%, which is an above average response rate for this group of respondents (Reddick & Frank, 2006; Caruson & MacManus, 2007).

The survey respondents were asked to self-identify the type of community in which they work. There were six categories presented, ranging from rural/small town to major city. The sample distribution for the survey is as follows: 31% were from a rural/small town; 30% from a small city; 17% from suburbs/medium city; 7% from medium city; 7% from suburbs of a major city; and 3% from a major city. Because many respondents voluntarily identified themselves in their responses, it is possible to report that every major city was represented in the responses (i.e., Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus).

Two sets of analyses were completed on the survey responses. First, a correlation analysis on the responses was completed to determine if there were any statistically significant relationships. This was determined with a Pearson’s $r$ which determines the strength of relationships between two variables (Cronk, 2004, p. 39). Second, a logistic regression was completed on the data since many of the variables were coded as nominal dichotomous or categorical variables (Pollock, 2005, p. 180). A test for multi-collinearity was run, with values ranging from .035 to .493, and suggested no correlation between the independent variables.

**RESULTS**

Overall, the survey results show that about 90% of the responding law enforcement agencies in Ohio reported making changes in their policies regarding homeland security after 9/11. Every large and medium-sized city police chief reported making some changes. Ninety-eight percent of suburb/medium city chiefs did so, as did 94% and 93% of suburbs of medium-city and small-city chiefs, respectively. The lowest percent of departments reporting change was rural/small town departments, with only 78% reporting changes made after September 11. The changes made by different departments varied, but were generally made in each of the three categories noted above: communication, training, and funding. Each of these categories and the results of the survey are described in more detail below.

**Communication**

The survey results show that in Ohio, approximately 72% of police chiefs report increased communication with other Ohio law enforcement agencies. Every major city reported doing so, as did 92% of suburban departments. The medium cities were the smallest percentage (63%) to report increased communication with other state police departments. Additionally, almost half (about 48%) of Ohio departments reported having increased their communication with the federal government since 9/11. Again, more of the major cities reported increased communications with federal agencies (86%). Small-town agencies had the lowest percent of agencies reporting more communication with federal agencies (35%).
Moreover, 29% of agencies reported that they have created a contingency plan in case of a future terrorist attack. Over half (57%) of large city police departments reported having one, whereas only 20% of small, rural departments reported developing such a plan. When it comes to increased intelligence information overall, 53% of Ohio’s agencies reported increased intelligence operations after 9/11. In the large cities, 86% reported doing so, whereas only 39% of rural/small town departments reported increased intelligence operations.

When asked if the department had a written plan that describes the procedures for responding to a future attack, less than half (40%) reported they did. This included 70% of medium cities, 64% of small cities, and 67% of large cities. Across the state, only 32% of agencies overall reported that they are part of a Joint Terrorism Task Force. Those task forces sometimes included other agencies, including FBI, DEA, CIA, Secret Service, Highway Patrol, and many others. Of the large cities in the study, 71% reported being part of a task force. On the opposite end, only 10% of small, rural departments reported similar action.

Training

The survey of Ohio law enforcement showed that 73% of agencies reported increased training of their officers and management. Almost every agency in Ohio (98%) took part in NIMS training at some level. This included 100% of large cities, 90% of medium cities, and only 53% of rural departments. For many, this was online training, but many departments opted for classroom training instead. Departments across the state completed a variety of courses either online or in a classroom setting. All but 27 departments reported training in some combination of ICS 100, 200, 700 and/or 800.

As one might expect, police departments in larger cities were more likely to report increased training of officers. Specifically, 100% of large cities reported more training after 9/11. Also as one might expect, small, rural police departments had the lowest percent of increased training, with only 53% reporting as such.

Grants

According to the survey results, only 30% of police agencies across Ohio received some kind of financial assistance to help pay for the changes they have made. Almost all of the funding (81%) was a one-time grant payment, but for some (10%) it was some type of automatic payment sent to all departments. Of those agencies that received grant money, about half (47%) used it to purchase new equipment. Others (37%) used it to improve communication either within their department or with other agencies, and 17% used the money for training. The amount of the funding ranged from $2,000 to $10,000,000, with an average of $412,190.50.

Correlations

The responses to the question, “has your department made changes since 9/11 regarding Homeland Security?” were statistically related to other survey responses. These are listed in Table 2 [next page]. This shows that those departments that made changes were more likely to increase training of officers, create a contingency plan, and purchase new equipment. They also increased communication with both the federal government agencies and those based in Ohio, increasing intelligence information overall. They made changes to protect their critical infra-
structure, created a written response plan for future attacks, and were more likely to be part of a joint terrorism task force. Not surprisingly, those departments that made changes also took part in NIMS training and received some type of grant money to facilitate those changes. There was a significant correlation between making changes and type of community: larger communities were more likely to make changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Did your department make changes</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>Money?</th>
<th>Community type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes?</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.192**</td>
<td>.201**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Training</td>
<td>.493**</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.124*</td>
<td>.147*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased new equipment</td>
<td>.338*</td>
<td>.126*</td>
<td>.431**</td>
<td>.139*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created a contingency plan</td>
<td>.195**</td>
<td>.170**</td>
<td>.153*</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased communication with fed govt</td>
<td>.287**</td>
<td>.134*</td>
<td>.167**</td>
<td>.213**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased communication with ohio agencies</td>
<td>.493**</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.271**</td>
<td>.160*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased intelligence info</td>
<td>.237**</td>
<td>.126*</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.184**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to protect critical infrastructure</td>
<td>.219**</td>
<td>.168*</td>
<td>.276**</td>
<td>.193**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written Plan</td>
<td>.195**</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.138*</td>
<td>.171**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTTF</td>
<td>.185**</td>
<td>.187**</td>
<td>.153*</td>
<td>.282**</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMS training</td>
<td>.242**</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.169**</td>
<td>.094</td>
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<tr>
<td>Money?</td>
<td>.192**</td>
<td>.177**</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.146*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community type</td>
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<td>.355**</td>
<td>.146*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Amount</td>
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<td>.714**</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>.301*</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS Officer</td>
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<td>.199**</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.153*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.177*</td>
<td>3.55**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**: Significant at .01 level; *: Significant at .05 level; +: Unable to compute

There were also strong positive correlations found between the number of officers in a department and many other responses, as shown in Table 2. Those responding departments with more sworn, full-time officers were associated with a department’s choice to purchase new equipment after 9/11 and creating a written contingency plan in case of a future attack. The larger departments were more likely to have increased communication with the federal government and increased intelligence overall. There was an association between the number of officers and if they had made changes to protect their infrastructure, and if they were part of a joint terrorism task force. The number of officers was associated with receiving money and having a homeland security officer in their department.

When asked if the department had received any fiscal grants geared toward making changes with regards to homeland security, many departments answered that they had. If a department
received more money, they were more likely to make changes, as reported in Table 2. Receiving money was also correlated with increased training of officers, purchasing new equipment, creating a contingency plan, and increased communication with both federal and Ohio law enforcement agencies. If a department received money, it was more likely to have made changes to protect its critical infrastructure, be part of a joint terrorism task force in their area, have a written plan for a future attack, and take part in NIMS training. Whether or not a department received money was associated with membership in a joint terrorism task force, type of community, and number of officers.

As expected, the size of the community in which a department was located was related to many variables. In larger communities, departments were more likely to make changes, including increased training of officers, purchase of new equipment, and increased communication with other departments, both on the federal and state levels. Larger communities were more likely to have made changes to protect their infrastructure and have a written plan in case of future attack. Police departments in larger communities were associated with having a written plan, and being part of a joint terrorism task force. Larger departments were more likely to receive money, have more officers, and a homeland security officer. These results are also listed in Table 2.

**LOGISTIC REGRESSION**

The second analysis completed on the data was a series of logistic regression analyses. In the first analyses, three models were created in which three different dependent variables were explained by the same three independent variables. Each of the independent variables would logically seem to drive events: the amount of money received in grants, the size of the department (as measured by the number of officers) and the type of community (i.e., rural, urban, etc.). The three dependent variables were if the department made changes, if they took part in NIMS training, and if they had a homeland security officer. In other words, it was assumed that whether a department made changes in their homeland security measures, whether they chose to take part in NIMS training, and whether they had a homeland security officer was dependent upon whether the department received money to do so, the size of the department, and whether they were located in a major city.

**Model 1**

The first model included, as a dependent variable, whether or not a department made changes. The independent variables were money received, the department size (number of officers), and type of community. The model is:

\[
\text{Changes} = a + b(1) \text{ money} + b(2) \text{ officers} + b(3) \text{ community}
\]

To determine if a variable is statistically significant, the significance of the Wald statistics must be under .10 (Pollock, 2005, p. 188). In this first model, the results indicate that only one of the variables is statistically significant, which is money received. This means that, controlling for other variables, a one-unit increase in money received increases the odds that a department will make changes in its homeland security procedures. These results are shown in Table 3 [next page].
### Table 3. Logistic Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Money Received</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>Community Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Wald Statistic</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.2.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.2.107</td>
<td>1.047</td>
<td>4.055*</td>
<td>8.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.704</td>
<td>.1.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>1.613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NIMS Training</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald Statistic</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.649</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>8.208</td>
<td>5.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.165</td>
<td>3961.473</td>
<td>2.890*</td>
<td>77432056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td></td>
<td>.732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS Officer</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald Statistic</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.2609</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>37.313</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.361</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>1.664</td>
<td>1.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>2.525</td>
<td>1.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Model 2

The second model in the study attempts to determine why a law enforcement department would complete NIMS training. The model is shown as:

\[
\text{NIMS Training} = a + b(1) \text{ money} + b(2) \text{ officers} + b(3) \text{ community}
\]

The results, shown in Table 3, show that neither money received nor community type are statistically significant in explaining if departments completed the required training. However, the size of the department is slightly significant. Thus, a one-unit increase in department size (number of sworn officers) will increase the odds of completing NIMS training. In other words, we can estimate the odds of a department completing NIMS training based on the number of officers in the department.

### Model 3

The third model in the study was an attempt to determine why some agencies have an officer who focuses on homeland security issues, such as writing and obtaining grants. This is depicted as:

\[
\text{Homeland Security Officer} = a + b(1) \text{ money} + b(2) \text{ officers} + b(3) \text{ community}
\]

According to the results in Table 3, we cannot estimate the odds of a department having a homeland security officer. None of the variables are statistically significant, and thus do not have a role in determining the probability that a law enforcement agency will designate one person to serve as a homeland security officer.
Model 4

The fourth regression model incorporates funding as a dependent variable to determine if the size of the community, the size of the department, and whether they had a homeland security officer have an impact on the funding received by a police department (Reddick & Frank, 2006; Caruson & MacManus, 2006). A variable noting whether or not the department had an identified critical infrastructure was not included in the model because too many of the departments would not answer that question in the survey. Thus, the following formula shows the proposed relationship:

Money received = a + b(1) officers + b(2) community + b(3) HS Officer

The results of this analysis are in Table 4, below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.079</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>14.303</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>3.216*</td>
<td>1.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>1.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Officer</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>.410</td>
<td>1.296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results show that while neither the community type nor the presence of a homeland security officer influences the amount of money a department receives for homeland security, the size of the department does. As the size of the department increases, the agency is more likely to receive homeland security grants.

RESPONDENT COMMENTS

The survey gave respondents an opportunity to provide their opinions about the status of homeland security in Ohio. Some of the comments made by the responding police chiefs were very telling. They indicated a frustration about homeland security initiatives and the funding (or lack thereof) for such. Almost every comment had the same general theme—the lack of funding for small departments to meet the goals set for them. Some of the comments were:

- No funding ever reaches the township.
- HS grants are bled dry before they reach the college level.
- They don’t give money to small agencies.
- Too small for grant monies.
- Small departments get no help in this area.
- Grants are very unequal.
- Funding is getting tough, yet government expects us to do more.
- Money has gotten stuck with the sheriffs and big cities—has not made it to 85% of local police agencies.
• Very disappointed with lack of funding.
• Community-wide protection has deteriorated since 9/11. Grant dollars that used to come to law enforcement now go to the state. 9/11 has cost my department $50,000 per year in loss of grant dollars. When the terrorists strike Ohio, we’ll be walking after them.
• Funding should be provided for all to fortify protection of this country. We do not need million-dollar buildings and increased administration overhead in the name of homeland security. We need funding for more personnel.
• It appears that homeland security money is specifically earmarked for federal or state-level entities. Their restrictions prohibit or at least discourage use of any funds on the county or local level. However we know that in all likelihood any terrorist activity is more likely to be noticed and recognized by local law enforcement than any federal source. Federal resources are scarce and seldom interact with local law enforcement authorities either in training or in sharing information or equipment.
• EMA/Fire departments get bulk of funding.

CONCLUSION/DISCUSSION

Since 2001, Homeland security has become a national priority, with programs implemented at the federal, state, and local levels that are geared toward increasing the safety of the U.S. (Simpson & Strang, 2004). Since the brunt of homeland security is handled at the local level, this study focused on that population. A survey of police chiefs across Ohio was completed to determine what changes were being made, and how different police agencies were responding to homeland security measures.

The survey results show that police departments across the state are responding in a variety of ways to the federal NRP and Ohio’s Homeland Security Strategic Plan. One area where police chiefs have reported action is in improving communication either within their departments or with other agencies. Currently, homeland security policy lacks a common language, so increasing communication becomes key (Gerber et al., 2005). The majority (90%) of the departments reported making changes, including every large and medium department and 78% of the small ones. The changes varied, obviously in response to the needs of the department and their location. This points to the trend that there will be enhanced and more consistent communication within and between state and federal agencies (vertical and horizontal communication) to prevent terrorist attacks. Sadly, only about a quarter of Ohio’s police departments (29%) have a contingency plan for a future attack in their jurisdiction. The lack of planning for the future could be a concern for many citizens and officials living in those areas.

There have also been changes in training for Ohio law enforcement officers in the post 9/11 period. Police agencies are now required to include NIMS training for all officers, from patrol to management, and most departments in Ohio are doing so. However, the current analysis shows that the size of the department, not the money they’ve received, tends to determine the extent to which a department has embraced officer training. Thus, small, rural departments lag behind larger ones in this regard, as one might expect. The training in many departments, regardless of size, however, is often limited, and involves officers completing an on-line program instead of hands-on training.
Finally, there have been changes in funding of police departments after 9/11. About a third of departments have received money to fund some sort of program for training or purchasing new technology. As expected, the larger cities are more likely to receive more funding, which in turn enables them to make more changes, either to purchase equipment or increase training of personnel. Most chiefs report using the money to purchase new equipment rather than to increase training of their officers. This seems unfair to the small and rural departments across the state that report that they do not receive enough additional money to meet the guidelines as set forth by the State of Ohio. Although it can be argued that the larger cities may be more likely to be the target of terrorist attacks, and that they are more likely to have structures that need to be protected, small agencies are equally in need of funding that will help them protect citizens in their direct jurisdictions and meet the safety standards set by the state. This finding supports earlier research that shows that 73% of Texas county officials indicate a lack of money for homeland security (Reddick & Frank, 2006). In fact, many local governments both in Ohio and elsewhere are still in need of equipment, gear, and training that will help them deal effectively with a terrorist attack (Caruson, 2004). Many states, in order to pay for homeland security equipment and training, have had to divert money from funds set aside for more frequent natural disasters (Roberts, 2005).

It appears as if no particular variable helps to explain if a department has a homeland security officer who can help the department focus their anti-terrorist activities. This means that small and large departments alike choose to have officers regardless of their financial situation.

The results of the current study show that law enforcement agencies across Ohio are responding to the new threats posed by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It appears that they are “on track” to developing law enforcement agencies that are ready and capable to respond to different emergencies. The departments are actively making changes to keep their citizens safe. The changes in homeland security procedures are, to some extent, driven by the amount of grant money they received from federal and/or state sources. Obviously, if a department has more money, they are more likely to make changes in response to terrorism. They are also driven by the size of the departments, and the type of community. At the same time, it is clear that more needs to be done, particularly in the equitable distribution of funds. This way, law enforcement agencies can protect the citizens of Ohio from any future, potential terrorist attacks, regardless of their size or type of community.

The findings of the current research are, of course, limited to law enforcement agencies in Ohio. Future research concerning local law enforcement’s role in homeland security in other states and regions will provide a better understanding of the needs faced by local law enforcement and the necessary actions of the federal government. This research should continue in all states, as each one faces different situations and problems.

Future research should also address the federal role in homeland security. A major task of the counter-terrorism program is defining the federal role in supporting state and local government programs (Carter, 2001, p. 21). While some have declared that it is not practical to have one agency in the federal government that is in charge of a mission that inherently must involve all levels of government as well as the private sector (Carter, 2001, p. 22), it seems to be virtually impossible for local law enforcement agencies to respond to federal mandates without substantial federal financial assistance. Homeland security seems to be on the path to becoming an unfunded mandate such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, Help Amer-
ica Vote Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Incarceration of Criminal Aliens Act, and No Child Left Behind (“Counties Identify,” 2005; Pascopella, 2006; “States Stuck,” 2004; Swindell, 2004; “Unfunded Mandates,” 2005). Unfortunately, states may have to accept that the federal government will not provide the money they need for homeland security in the future (Swindell, 2004).

Nonetheless, federal funding will need to continue as most experts in homeland security expect that local police will gradually develop new areas of expertise, increase their level of surveillance on their communities, and continue to protect their infrastructure (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007). DHS should lend its expertise to help shape subnational governments that may be struggling as to how to incorporate homeland security into their agencies (Roberts, 2007). The states must have discretion concerning how money is spent, since they know the greatest risks in their geographic areas (Roberts, 2007).

In sum, it appears that law enforcement agencies in Ohio are actively making efforts to meet the guidelines set by the federal and state government, but more needs to be done to help them accomplish this goal. Much remains to be done, including improving technology, coordinating intelligence information, and integrating federal and state initiatives (Caruson, 2004).
REFERENCES


Ohio Department of Public Safety. (2007, July 18). Ohio to receive $75.6 million in homeland security funding. Media release.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

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